Pakistan marked the 17th anniversary of Operation Sher-e-Dil on 09 September, but the occasion brought muted reflection rather than triumph. The operation, launched in 2008 to reclaim Bajaur Agency from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, had once been hailed as a turning point. Yet, nearly two decades later, the challenges it was meant to resolve remain deeply entrenched.
Operation Sher-e-Dil was Pakistan’s first major counter-insurgency campaign in the tribal belt after militants overran Bajaur in 2007. The offensive, carried out by the 26th Infantry Brigade alongside the Frontier Corps, Pakistan Air Force and tribal lashkars, succeeded in dislodging entrenched fighters and killing senior Al-Qaeda commander Abu Saeed al-Masri. Military communiqués at the time reported 1,500 militants killed, but only 30 soldiers lost. Despite the apparent success, analysts noted that the campaign left civilians displaced, infrastructure shattered, and militants regrouping across the porous Afghan border.
Sher-e-Dil: Tactical Gains, Strategic Stagnation
The campaign in Bajaur exposed both the Army’s strengths and its structural blind spots. Heavy bombardments and ground offensives cleared villages like Loyesam, but militants’ use of fortified tunnels and guerrilla tactics slowed progress. A security official quoted in Dawn recalled how “the insurgents melted into the mountains and returned within months,” highlighting the absence of follow-up governance.
Displacement was a major legacy. Thousands of families fled Bajaur and many returned to destroyed homes without compensation or services. Human rights groups warned at the time that alienation was sowing fertile ground for fresh recruitment. In this sense, Sher-e-Dil’s tactical brilliance never translated into lasting peace, a cycle that would define subsequent counter-terror operations.
2009–2014: A Carousel of Operations
Following Bajaur, Pakistan launched a series of major offensives. Operation Rah-e-Raast in Swat (2009) reclaimed Mingora and briefly restored calm, while Rah-e-Nijat in South Waziristan (2009) involved up to 45,000 troops and killed hundreds of militants. Official briefings painted these as successes, yet leadership figures like Hakimullah Mehsud escaped into Afghanistan, where they regrouped.
Operations such as Brekhna in Mohmand (2009), Koh-e-Sufaid in Kurram (2011), and Rah-e-Shahadat in Tirah Valley (2013) repeated the same pattern. Militants were displaced from one valley only to reappear in another. A former officer interviewed by Reuters admitted, “It was like squeezing a balloon — pressure in one place just pushed them into another.”
Zarb-e-Azb: Brilliance Meets Border Failure
The largest of these campaigns, Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014–2017), was launched after the TTP’s Karachi airport assault. With 30,000 troops and relentless airstrikes, the Army dismantled hundreds of hideouts and claimed over 3,500 militant deaths. ISPR declared it a “decisive victory.” Yet, the gains were undermined by porous borders. Militants escaped into Afghanistan, sustaining attacks from safe havens in Kunar and Nangarhar.
The displacement of nearly one million civilians created humanitarian crises that lingered for years. While terror incidents briefly fell to a six-year low, no political reconciliation or deradicalisation strategy followed. The insurgency was weakened, not destroyed.
Azm-e-Istehkam: Old Lessons Unlearned
In June 2024, Pakistan unveiled Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, billed as the comprehensive answer to extremism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Officials described it as marrying kinetic action with socio-economic uplift under the 2014 National Action Plan. But the data tells another story. The Centre for Research and Security Studies reported a 66 percent rise in fatalities in 2025 alone, with 573 security forces, 706 militants, and 369 civilians killed by February.
Locals in Bannu and Quetta have accused the military of repeating old mistakes: alienating civilians, failing to secure borders, and ignoring political roots of militancy. A tribal elder quoted in Al Jazeera said, “They come, they bomb, they leave. The militants return and the Army blames the people.” This mirrors the failures of Sher-e-Dil and Zarb-e-Azb, suggesting Azm-e-Istehkam is less a new chapter than a tired sequel.
A Cycle of Resurgence
Across 17 years, one pattern is undeniable: Pakistan’s counter-insurgency campaigns deliver tactical victories that look impressive on paper but collapse into renewed violence within years. Leadership decapitation is offset by decentralised TTP factions. Civilian displacement fuels resentment. Economic neglect leaves areas vulnerable to extremist narratives. The balloon is squeezed, but never deflated.
On social media, posts marking Sher-e-Dil’s anniversary reflected this frustration. “Seventeen years later, Bajaur is still bleeding,” one user wrote on X, echoing widespread disillusionment. Muted celebration of the operation underscores how public faith in military “victories” has eroded with each failed promise of stability.
The Anniversary That Exposes More Than It Celebrates
By marking Sher-e-Dil’s anniversary, Pakistan’s Army sought to project resilience and continuity. But the milestone has instead highlighted the failures of an approach that relies on military force without political strategy. Fifteen major operations later, the TTP remains potent, Baloch insurgents have escalated their attacks, and civilian casualties continue to rise.
For DG-ISPR, the narrative of success remains essential. Yet the facts — rising fatalities, repeated displacements, and recurring insurgent resurgence — undercut the rhetoric. As analysts warn, Pakistan is trapped in a loop: fighting the same battles, in the same valleys, against the same enemies, without learning from its own history. Sher-e-Dil, remembered today, is less a symbol of victory than a reminder of a war without end.
